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Abstract
A revolution is taking place in telecommunication networks. New services are appearing
on platforms such as third generation cellular phones (3G) and broadband Internet access.
This motivates the transition from mostly switched to all-IP networks. The replacement
of the traditional shallow and well-defined interface to telephony networks brings accrued
flexibility, but also makes the network accordingly difficult to properly secure. This
paper surveys the implications of this transition on security issues in telecom
applications. It does not give an exhaustive list of security tools or security protocols. Its
goal is rather to initiate the reader to the security issues brought to carrier class servers by
this revolution.
Introduction
Telephony networks typically interface to subscribers through a shallow and well-defined
interface. After the introduction of out-of-band control technology based on Signaling
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System 7 (SS7) in 1970s, the number of security incidents involving the core telephone
network infrastructure reduced substantially. From then on, the commands that
subscribers could send were limited to tone or pulse dialing of digits for signaling, switch
hook flashes for simple features like call waiting and 3-way calling, and some dial access
codes for features like caller-id blocking. On the subsequent incidents, never was the
telephony core infrastructure compromised. 
The telephony operating environment, however, is experiencing dramatic changes.
Companies previously labeled as telephone operators are now offering broadband data
access and numerous IP services, including mail and web hosting. Furthermore, these
services may not remain totally separate from the traditional telephony channels, as more
closely new integrated services are offered: 
• Third generation cellular phones offer voice and high-speed data communications.
• Location services enable applications to query the precise location of cellular
phones for emergency response, or targeted information/advertisement purposes.
• Many of the data-oriented applications being deployed are directly derived from
popular Internet applications, or give direct access to Internet-located information
content.
The result is the current move toward all-IP and IP-interoperable networks (Figure 1).
The resulting communication infrastructure, integrating voice, data and multimedia, can
be considered as a part of the single large global network, the Internet. It contains
traditional wired and wireless phones and computers, and increasingly multi-functional
small computers presented as telephony enabled personal digital assistants (PDA). The
stateless phone of yesterday is replaced by a small computer, which is both vulnerable to
attacks and capable of launching attacks. With the Internet, the explosion of the
communication network brought a new field of possible threats [SANS2001,
CERT2001]: attacks on or through the communication infrastructure between the server
and the clients. The challenge is to have a network offering the flexibility associated with
the Internet, while preserving the security and reliability expected from carrier grade
equipment. 
  
February 2002
Figure 1: In the next generation telecom systems, the situation changes
from vertical markets to an all-IP network with multiple service providers.
In security, there is the notion of an enemy that perpetrates systematic attacks against a
system. Defending against systematic attacks contrasts with defending against
undesirable events that occur at random. This is a fundamental change from the
traditional telecom approach concentrated around countering undesirable events, rather
than systematic, deliberate and repetitive attacks from different sources. Defending
against random events can be accomplished by using techniques, e.g., redundancy, that
tilt the odds in one's favor. Redundancy is useless against a systematic attack since it just
adds the requirement that the very same attack be performed twice or more times.
Defending against systematic attacks requires using specific countermeasures that make
things impossible or at least very impractical for attackers. Words such as robust and
reliable have different meanings in both contexts and must be interpreted accordingly;
one kind of robustness does not imply the other. 
In Section 2, the security threats are reviewed, while Section 3 examines protection
measures associated with IP networks. Section 4 discusses the specific requirements of
carrier class environments, and the relative importance in this context of the different
security threats from Section 2 and security measures discussed in Section 3. 
Security Threats
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An attack is an attempt to circumvent the security policy of a system, to make it do
something it is not intended to do. When a possible attack is considered in context, it
becomes a threat and can be assigned a risk factor (i.e., a probability of occurrence or an
expectation of damage) that essentially serves to prioritize this type of attack. This
context includes the known or estimated vulnerabilities that are present on a system and
the measures that are put in place to counter their exploitation by specific attacks. Threats
against a system are enumerated in a threat model that is the basis for developing a
customized security policy, or strategy. One actual instance of an attack is referred to as
an incident. 
Since a system can be compromised with just one breach, easiest attacks (the weakest
links of the chain) must be the first ones to be countered. 
Threat Model
For every threat, can be defined: 
• Vulnerability exploited
• Countermeasures
• Likelihood
• Harm: it explains the type of the damage to the system, for example the loss of
hard disk content.
• Impact: it describes the seriousness of the attack, major or minor damages,
• Risk: it is a function of the likelihood of a threat, the resulting impact, and the
effectiveness of countermeasures to it. The table below presents the risk level
according to the likelihood of a threat and its impact.
Low
likelihood
Medium
likelihood
High
likelihood
Low impact Low risk Medium risk High risk
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Medium
impact
Low risk Medium risk High risk
High impact Medium risk High risk Critical risk
Types of Attacks
It is possible to classify attacks according to different factors. For example: 
• Based on the techniques that are used and the vulnerabilities that are exploited
[Ranum1996].
• By the kind of gain they give the attacker upon success relative to the position
held by the attacker prior to the attack.
• Remote and local attacks can be stringed together in a process known as privilege
escalation.
• Preliminary attacks [Scambray2001] can assist a main attack, e.g., by making sure
the attacker remains unidentified.
• Based on the fact that origin of the attack is in internal to the corporate network or
external to it.
In the context of a telecom infrastructure, the possibility of local attacks must especially
not be neglected. Indeed, their local systems are not limited to a single switch and may be
quite large and complex; they are typically clusters of resources that are connected by
internal protocols. They also provide access to different users and processes with
different needs that should translate into different privileges. 
If we classify possible types of attacks in terms of what are the attackers’ motivations, we
can list the following attacks: 
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• Denial of service: bringing computing or networking resources to exhaustion so
that a service is unavailable, as long as the attack lasts, or the host or network
element crashes (until manual intervention or automatic re-initialization).
• Theft of service: obtaining a service for which one does not subscribe, or a better
grade of service (e.g., gold instead of silver grade QoS in DiffServ) than the one
paid for.
• Information theft: Unauthorized copying of information. This is typically done for
information that can be used for financial gain (such as credit-card numbers), but
can be done for other purposes, such as software piracy.
• "Socially motivated" attacks: an attacker may wish to impersonate somebody
specific in order to commit detectable crimes and have the other person charged.
Attackers may also wish to target individuals or organizations as a matter of
personal revenge, or as part of a violent activist or terrorist activity.
These attacks can be performed using different mechanisms: 
• Social engineering: fooling someone, with minimal or no use of technology.
• Masquerading (or impersonation): breaching authentication (which can be based
on secrets, tokens, or biometrics), for instance by theft or eavesdropping.
• Exploit of implementation flaw: purposely stimulating a system that fails to
properly validate or manipulate external inputs of all kinds in a wrong way. This
covers memory overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and improper decoding of
URL % syntax and UTF-8.
• Data driven attacks: using Trojans and viruses.
• Network infrastructure attacks: exploiting design flaws in the protocols that
implement the Internet infrastructure, for example: DNS spoofing, source routing,
routing tables manipulations, generation of many ICMP replies by sending an
ICMP request to a broadcast address, TCP connections termination or hijacking,
and using FTP to order one server to inject data on a specific port of another
server.
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Discussion
Every attack must be countered, or, at least, countermeasures must be described so that
their use may be evaluated. Some of the attacks that have been exposed are made possible
by fundamental elements of Internet design that one may have to live with. Some attacks
can be countered by simply making an effort to implement and/or configure existing
security-relevant solutions. 
The source of many vulnerabilities on the server side is faulty software or
misconfigurations. Attacks linked to software reliability can be countered by attempting
to improve the reliability and by responding rapidly when vulnerabilities are exposed.
Attacks linked to misconfigurations still can be countered by proper training and the
definition of clear procedures. 
The Field of Security
Security is part of a bigger picture called risk management [Schneier2000]. Some of the
risks involved are not linked to the business model or the market situation, but rather to
deliberate undesirable events meant to harm the company. Although the implicit reaction
would be to systematically fight back against such events, doing so costs money and there
are actually several sensible options to consider. One possibility is simply to take the hit
and accept the costs associated with an incident. Another is to purchase insurance against
the associated threat. The final option is to fight back; this is what the field of security is
all about. However, it is important to keep in mind that, in order to first choose an option,
an analysis of costs/benefits (expected losses caused by the attack, cost of
countermeasures), and risks (probability of successful attack with and without the
countermeasures), has to be performed. In any case, a contingency and recovery plan is
needed. 
There are several types of security interventions: preventive measures, detection
measures, response measures, recovery measures and forensics. No amount of prevention
can make all undesirable events impossible; doing so would cost an infinite amount of
money. A given level of prevention can thus be seen as a way to buy time before
detection and response measures are performed, and as damage control to minimize the
damages from a possible attack. Detection is an important yet very often neglected part of
security activity. No response can be performed without prior detection, though the
detection measures should collect the right information to prepare for an adequate
response.. Despite all the preventive measures, there is no 100% secure system, therefore
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the recovery measures should be thought of and be in place at the time of setting up any
system. Finally, forensics measures are primordial to find the perpetrators and prepare the
company in face of possible legal issues. 
Main Properties
In security, three main properties are usually considered [Garfinkel1999, Russell1991]: 
• Confidentiality (or secrecy): A secure computer must not allow information to be
disclosed to any user or process not authorized to access it.
• Integrity (or accuracy): The system must not corrupt the information or allow any
unauthorized malicious or accidental change. In network communications, a
variant of accuracy is called authenticity. It provides a way to verify the origin of
data by determining who entered or sent the data.
• Availability: The computer system's hardware and software must keep working
efficiently and the system must be able to recover quickly and completely if a
disaster occurs.
The above definitions are often completed by [Anderson2001, Ryan2003]:
• Accountability: A secure computer should provide with the evidence on the
actions of the users so that they can not successfully deny at a later time those
actions   
• Privacy: The computer should protect the personal secrets and information related
to different users. 
These properties have traditionally been emphasized in that order (CIA) in the
intelligence community. In the contemporary context of the Internet, emphasis in the
reverse order is more pertinent (AIC); these three are the ones most widely accepted in
the literature. Though, other related properties have also been mentioned. 
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Standards
From a telecommunications industry standpoint, national boundaries now have less
influence on infrastructure deployment than in the past. Because of this, the necessity of
an internationally accepted standard for security becomes more and more important. 
Past efforts of the American Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), or
"Orange Book", and the European Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
(ITSEC) have now been merged as the Common Criteria (CC), also known as ISO
standard 15408. Such a standard introduces concepts that include evaluation, protection
profiles, assurance components, and assurance levels [CSE1999]. 
Context
The context in which the security mechanisms should be implemented is very important.
Context parameters include: 
• Hardware context: hardware hosting server and client applications. The factors to
take into account are: processing power, available memory
• Transport Media: connection to outside world, network infrastructure. For
example: LAN/WAN, all-IP-network, radio waves (more susceptible to
eavesdropping), etc.
• Software:
o OS: irrespective of the software mechanisms built at application level, the
node's OS plays an essential role in efficiency and feasability of security
mechanisms.
o Middleware: it plays an important role in the development of the global
information infrastructure. Middleware based service architectures
facilitate the rapid development and deployment of new services by
enabling software reuse and hiding the complexity of programming
distributed applications.
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o Application: Robustness for server and client applications plays an
essential role in the security of the system.
Hardware Security
Flaws in hardware can be used to eavesdrop on essential data like private keys used for
cryptography. These flaws can be a plant error or a deliberate back door. An adequate
audit of hardware material by the buyer, or buying reports from third party companies,
are solutions. 
As encryption/decryption of outgoing and ingoing data becomes inevitable tasks in new
systems, there will be more and more specialized hardware available. Many big
companies have ongoing plans for integrating specialized circuits to their commercial
processors. The availability of these specialized hardware and their ever-decreasing costs,
combined with the increasing costs of losses due to security incidents, will ease their
penetration and use in the market. 
Software Security
Software is a fundamental part of the server. Unfortunately, most security vulnerabilities
are software related. 
Operating System
The following operating systems are suitable to be used for telecommunication class
applications. They include Unix-like operating systems such as Linux, FreeBSD,
OpenBSD, Solaris, and proprietary operating systems developed by Telecom companies. 
An operating system, by its architecture, can simplify or complicate security policy
implementation. For example, it is obvious that an operating system that does not support
any access control is much more open to security holes on the application or middleware
levels than an operating system providing developers with strict access controls. 
One important aspect of software security is that for security mechanisms to be efficient,
they must be unbypassable. The operating system is therefore the best place to implement
these mechanisms. 
  
Middleware
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The middleware software must provide the developers with means to implement security
mechanisms transparently and efficiently. As the lifetime for a middleware software is
generally longer than an application, it makes more economical sense to concentrate
efforts on making this layer secure. Also, it is more likely that security holes will be
identified over time and solved. 
However, having a middleware software providing security services is necessary, but it is
not enough to make an application secure. At the application level, security middleware
must provide developers with: 
• Access controls: for application's functions and data, at sufficient granularity
• Audit of application events
• Authorization: Control of secure invocations according to the user's privileges
• Authentication: Use credentials to identify initiating principal
• Non-repudiation: Generate/verify evidence of actions, e.g., proof of creation
receipt, origin, delivery of data. Evidence includes information to prove integrity
of data, date/time, origin, action,
• Logging: Application transfers/stores evidence. It must be possible for developers
to decide what to log.
These mechanisms can be explicitly implemented through calls to an API, or calls to
services (or agents) of middleware. They can also be implicitly implemented through
activation of security services. For example, in object-oriented design, one can imagine
having secure objects, which log all their method invocations, used as ancestor classes
transparently to the developers. 
Application
This is where most dangerous security holes are found. Too often, developers are under
high pressure to deliver programs on time. This means that their code is not thoroughly
tested, and often contains security holes. Therefore, it is mandatory to have security
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mechanisms to encapsulate the application level. It must be impossible to bypass these
mechanisms while trying to access the resources. 
It is almost impossible to implement security without providing developers with tools and
means through middleware software or the use of specialized libraries, with defined
standardized APIs. 
Network Security
As the recent past shows, most kinds of attacks now occur from a distance, over a
network. Networks themselves were not initially designed with security in mind. The
vulnerabilities these attacks exploit can stem from several possible sources: the inherent
design of the communication protocols, the design of the network topology, or the
absence of a properly implemented quota (rate limiting) system to prevent denial of
service attacks. 
With the publicity surrounding the dangers of the wide-open Internet, many organizations
concentrated all their network security efforts on the installation of firewalls around their
networks. This approach results in heavily guarded network perimeters, while the inside
of the networks have few security measures deployed. Analysis shows that most frauds
are perpetrated by people from inside the organization, thus well inside the guarded
network and not exposed to any check by the firewalls. Similarly, once an intruder
breaches a firewall, through a hole in network design or a security flaw in the firewall
itself, no barriers are left to prevent major damages. 
Many security attacks easily pass through typical, level 3, firewalls. For example, Trojan
horse software installed on the server maliciously or by error, can not be detected by a
level 3 firewall. Content filtering firewalls may block such attacks but only when dealing
with a known threat, which mandates frequent updates, and only if they can tackle the
complete network throughput without being an unacceptable bottleneck. 
Discussion
An effective security implementation must be based on simultaneous secure mechanisms
in all areas: hardware, software, and network infrastructure. In the end, the whole security
process can be reduced to answers to the following questions: 
• What level of security is needed?
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• How to get it?
• How to know it is there?
• How to maintain it?
Security Requirements for Carrier Class
Servers
This section reviews carrier class systems, identifies traditional security practices, and
then presents specific security-oriented requirements. 
Specificities of Carrier Class Systems
Reliability
Reliability (as a part of availability) has long been emphasized for telecom systems (e.g.,
5-nines, or 99.999%). In case of error or failure, it is seen as more desirable that the
system continues to run and provide functionality in a fail-over fashion than not run at all.
Unfortunately, fail-over modes of operations may have been designed in a way that is not
necessarily fail-safe (i.e., safe in a security sense). 
Modular Multi-Server Systems
Architectures (e.g., wireless networks ones), use a variety of servers as basic building
blocks (which may be implemented as clusters). These are interdependent and provide
services to each other. In order for the whole system to work as intended, every server
must function properly. They must trust each other. Security mechanisms can only be
used within one server, or to make sure that it has secured connections to the right servers
with which it has to exchange. One server cannot secure another. 
Remote Operation & Maintenance
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As a consequence of a distributed architecture, O&M needs to be performed in a
coordinated fashion. This implies remote O&M. The communication that supports this
will need to be secured, whether they rely on a private dedicated network or on a public
one. 
Context
This section examines the typical characteristics of telecommunication servers from
different points of view, while considering the advent of next generation telecom
technology. 
• Client machines: a wide range of devices from cellular phones and PDAs to
desktop systems. The client's capacity to accept security mechanisms impacts
server side security.
• Server machines: Powerful machines with huge amount of storage, memory and
CPU, for instance a cluster with hundreds of nodes.
• Internal network or Private transport infrastructure, typically several internal IP
based LANs used exclusively for the telecom servers, some of which for intra
cluster communication.
• External network or Public transport infrastructure, typically shared among
different users or service providers. It includes access mode mechanisms and
external network. It provides IP connectivity for private or public networks
(Gigabit Ethernet, ATM, SONET, Microwave), wired subscribers’ lines (ADSL
or coaxial cables), or wireless access.
• OS: most telephony equipment was running specialized operating systems
developed internally. The current trend is to use more Components off the Shelf
(COTS), running standard operating systems and protocols (e.g., POSIX and IP),
especially for new services. This decreases the development costs and shortens the
development time.
• Middleware: earlier systems relied on specialized internal solutions. Standard
systems like CORBA are increasingly used.
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• Application: There are two fundamental changes: introduction of new players
from outside Telecom companies, and the introduction of new complex services.
Various servers that are part of the telephony infrastructure (e.g., servers from
SS7, 3G, WCDMA, and UMTS), have to support services that are new to it (e.g.,
mail and web), many of which allow complex interactions, including running
code written by third parties (e.g., application servers supporting Java Beans).
This changes how software is managed on new telecom servers, as telecom
companies do not control the whole application development process: from
inception to testing and maintenance.
For a long time, software development for Telecom systems was a field apart with its
own peculiarities. It now follows many of the same concepts found in the IT business,
like software reuse and using COTS. However, there are still many requirements specific
to Telecom systems like fault tolerance and high availability. 
The security mechanisms must be able to accommodate the typical context of hundreds of
thousands of small nomadic clients (PDA or phone with limited memory and CPU
power) to provide security for this high cumulative bandwidth in acceptable time delays.
This may preclude complex computations on the clients, and requires servers capable of
serving thousands of requests per second. 
Requirements
The security requirements for new Telecom applications are [Lang2000]: 
• Support for many (potentially nomadic) users, multiple domains, multiple
providers
• Support for dynamic hardware and software updates, especially urgent security
updates
• Support for "multilateral security":
o Secure interaction between domains with different security policies,
o Dynamic security policies: ability to change the security policy (depending
on server load, context, user privileges, new security threats, etc.) and
make it effective rapidly.
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o Security Negotiation Facility
o Many different parties involved, from different operators to different
service providers
o Many differing implementations and mechanisms used, including the best
established standards (IPv4, IPv6, IPSec, ISAKMP, SSL/TLS, SSH,
Radius, Diameter, etc.)
• Quality of Protection (QoP) depends on the type of service, and user. For
example, one may not wish to implement costly security mechanisms for all
clients (e.g., purchasing hardware keys for low volume clients).
• Secure Billing Facility:
• Non-repudiation (NR) service required
• Legal requirements: Data protection, legal data access,
• Security functionality for low performance/bandwidth systems
• Security for QoS services (e.g., real-time).
The security mechanisms implementing these requirements must in turn support: 
• Fault tolerance, the security mechanisms must not become a single point of
failure, on the other hand they must resist to possible failures of materials.
• High availability, the telecom applications are highly available. The security
mechanisms corresponding to these applications must be reliable to the same
degree in order to assume the security in all situations.
• Scalability:
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o Scalable cross-domain authentication
o Scalable authorization
• Transparency:
o Transparent security policy
o Easy implementation of applications, it must not make the development
difficult
o Easy administration
o Low performance overhead
• Consistency: coherent security policy must be applied among different
components of servers and among involved servers in providing the service. This
is to ensure an end-to-end security between clients and the server. For example,
the same encryption algorithm must be supported on the server and clients
• Flexibility: each market may have specific requirements, and these evolve over
time, even different clients of a same server may have different requirements
• Interoperability: between different security mechanisms for different operators,
between different security technologies, protocols, and services
• Variety of quality of protection: providing the operator with different qualities of
protection. This in order to allow the operator to implement different services
according to the client needs.
Security Level
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Cluster-based telecom systems can be categorized according to the implicit trust or
distrust of their components and environment: External network, Internal network, Server
software (Operating System, Middleware, and Applications). 
Security levels for clustered servers.
Server application
software
Internal network External network
Level 0 Implicitly trusted Implicitly trusted Implicitly trusted
Level 1 Implicitly trusted Implicitly trusted Not trusted
Level 2 Implicitly trusted Not trusted Not trusted
Level 3 Not trusted Implicitly trusted Not trusted
Level 4 Not trusted Not trusted Not trusted
In the table above, "not trusted" implies that mechanisms to prevent, detect, and respond
to attacks must be implemented to fill the corresponding security void. 
Level 0 corresponds to many existing user machines on the Internet. Level 1 and 2 are the
case for many servers in enterprise environment, using a firewall for protection from
attacks coming from the outside world. Level 3 security is a server capable of
downloading code from a third party service provider through a dedicated line, (e.g., Java
Enterprise Beans application server capable of importing third-party code); the internal
network is trusted but not the application. Level 4 is the same server in a hostile
environment where the internal network could be under attack. 
Naturally Level 4 is the most secure level. However, the authors consider Level-2
security to be enough for a normal telecom server not exposed directly to clients and not
in a hostile environment. 
Perspectives
Security incidents are more frequent than ever on the Internet, and attacks are of
increasingly different types, from more varied sources, and are becoming more
sophisticated. Meanwhile, there is a deep change in the Telecom market caused by the
emergence of all-IP networks. Therefore, more efforts are being focused on security
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issues in the telecom world. One usual mistake is to base all the security on firewalls. As
demonstrated many times recently, this is not enough to ensure security for a critical
server. To increase security a step further, level 2 security can be attained today by
combining different existing solutions. Even then, there are still two issues remaining. 
First, the integration and management of these different solutions is very painful, when
possible. This often results in the absence of interoperability between different security
mechanisms. In many cases, the difficulties raised when integrating these systems result
in an almost impossible system to maintain and upgrade. With time, many systems
become obsolete or insecure by the difficulty of keeping up with numerous security
patches and upgrades. Secondly, this does not seem to be enough in the coming years to
protect key elements of a network. 
Therefore, there is a need for coherent solutions implicating different aspects of security
from packet filtering (firewalls) and intrusion detection, to access control and logging
inside the operating system kernel. For the time being, no such solution is clearly
emerging in the market. 
Building a level-4 cluster requires implementing and putting together many security
technologies that have been the focus of research for years, and turning this into a stable
system that still has competitive performance characteristics. However, the authors are
not aware of any real world deployment of such solutions, and this is most probably due
to the lack of consensus on the solutions and their high management complexity. 
Security protocols like IPSec are becoming a de facto standard for system security, just
like SSL/TLS is for application security. Telecom servers must then provide support for
them. 
Also of crucial importance is to be able to quantify the impact of different security
mechanisms on the performances and time delays for servers. This is a prerequisite to be
able to propose adequate security measures to developers according to the application
context. For example, what constitutes acceptable time delays differs for audio
applications and image centric applications. 
Conclusions
As the number of attacks on the Internet increases everyday, security becomes a feature
as essential as O&M, rather than luxury. In this perspective, the security vulnerability
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testing tends to become a complete part of IT activities as the conformance tests for
network protocols. 
Since it is not possible to eliminate 100% of the risks, much depends on the security level
that is desired for servers. Finding the "right" trade-off between the desired level of
security and the constraints due to performance issues is non-trivial. Security mechanisms
with prohibitively high costs in performance are just as unrealistic as very speedy servers
with no real security. The authors believe that Level 4 will be the desired level of security
for many Telecom servers in the coming years, as a direct consequence of the
requirements of forthcoming applications and environments. 
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